Pattern KV-A

Shared workstation with physical KVM switching

Four properties separate a secure KVM from an ordinary one: EDID emulation, one-way HID, no shared buffer, tamper indication.

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Area: KVM & VTC
Environments: 4
Products used: 10

How it is built

Data path
Path that does not exist

The peripherals are shared. That is why they are the channel, and why the switch has to be physical.

Used in these environments

Control room with several networksShared peripherals are the channel between the domains, and an ordinary KVM switch shares EDID, USB state and sometimes memory.
Emergency call centreRound-the-clock operation with no maintenance window: whatever is installed has to be replaceable while it runs.
Operator station in process industryOT and IT on the same desk, with the operator responsible for keeping them apart.
Vehicle and vessel installationThe rugged data diodes carry 810G and 461 data; no converter, extender or switch in the catalogue does.

How it works

One set of peripherals, several domains, and a physical switch between them. The peripherals are shared, which is precisely why they are the channel that has to be governed.

Four properties separate a secure KVM from an ordinary one

An emulated EDID presented to each source rather than the display’s own. A keyboard and mouse path that is unidirectional in hardware. No buffer, memory or configuration that survives a switch. And tamper indication on everything that affects those three.

USB is the part that gets forgotten

Only HID class belongs across a domain boundary. Storage devices, composite devices and devices that change class after enumeration have to be rejected — and a keyboard with its own memory is a shared object whether or not anyone thinks of it that way.

The indication has to be real

Driven by the state of the equipment, not by a control system’s belief about it. An operator who has to infer which domain is active will eventually infer wrong.

In the catalogue